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Abstract - Given the rise ofphishing over the past 5
years, a recurring question is why users continue to
fall for these scams? Various technical
countermeasures have been proposed to try and
counter phishing, and none have yet comprehensively
succeeded in preventing users from becoming victims.
This paper argues that an explicit model of user
psychology is required to understand user behaviour
in (a) processing phishlng e-mails, (b) clicking on
links to phishing websites, and (c) interacting with
these websites. Many users engage in e-mail and web
activity with an inappropriately high level of trust:
users are constantly rewarded by their online
interactions, even where there is a low level of
formalised trust between the sending and receiving
parties, eg, ifan e-mail claims to be sent from a bank,
then it must be so, even if there has been no a priori
exchange of credentials mediated by a trusted third
party. Previously, mathematical models have been
developed to predict trust established and
maintenance based on reputation scores (e.g., Tran et
al [1, 2J). This paper considers two inter-related
questions: (a) can we model the behaviour of users
learning to trust, based on non-associative models of
learning (habituation and sensiusation), and (b) can
we then locate this behavioural activity in a broader
psychological model with a view to identifying
potential countermeasures which might circumvent
learned behaviour?
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, e-mail has been exchanged using open
protocols with little regard for the establishment and/or
verification of user credentials. This design was both
intentional and well-intentioned, but the widespread
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abuse of e-mail now requires a more secure approach:
the rise of phishing attacks, which are causing loss to
consumers and banks, with the proceeds of crime being
diverted to organised crime [15]. However, given that a
wholesale replacement of e-mail clients and servers to
make them more trustworthy appears unlikely in the
short term, greater effort must be directed to (a)
modelling the psychological bases of user interaction
with e-mails and websites, specifically those used in
phishing attacks, and (b) implement countermeasures
which can be validated using such models.
One of they key characteristics of e-mail is that
users trust that the stated sender is who they say they
are. Two types of trust relationships are currently
assumed during the sending and receiving of e-mail:
• Users trust the "system" that they are
interacting with; and
• Sending and receiving entities trust each
other
A phishing attack makes use of these relationships
by betraying the trust that users place in their client
software. Davis et al [3] have suggested that systems
which operate in a manner which is consistent with
their user's expectation of human behaviour will have
the greatest user acceptance. Thus, extremely useful
software (like e-mail and web clients) have become
soft targets for organised crime.
This paper considers the broader case of how trust
relationships can (and should) be developed between
two or more entities that participate in a co-operative
activity, such as exchanging e-mails, especially where
the entities are not certified as trustworthy by an
independent third party (the solution suggested by [4]).
There can be many reasons why this certification is not
available, including:
• Participation in an e-mail exchange may
need to be anonymous for fear of
persecution or prosecution;
• The design of an e-mail system may
enforce anonymity;
• The cost of purchasing certificates;
• Lack of agreed infrastructure (protocols,
algorithms etc);
• The sheer scale and number of entities
participating in the system makes it
impractical to identify a single trust
authority or chain of authorities who can
vouch for the bona fides of all entities,
especially where rekeying is required [16]
An understanding of how users develop and manage
trust relationships in e-mail is critical if we are to
defeat phishing - clearly, users who have a history of
positive experiences in using e-mail (or web) have
come to trust the technology "in the large", and also at
the level of specific correspondents, such as banks,
stockbrokers, auction houses etc - in other words, the
cornerstone institutions of internet commerce.
One possible avenue in modelling trust would be to
develop models of trust that entities can use to compute
the trustworthiness of the parties that they interact
with, and provide this information directly back to the
user. Indeed, this is precisely what happens when one
user identifies a phishing e-mail (including sender
information) and submits a report to Phishtank - once
verified, this information can potentially be used by
other users to inform their decisions. In this example,
Phishtank acts somewhat like a trusted third party -
who stores trust data and forwards it on request.
In this paper, models of trust establishment and
management are considered, that relate directly to
phishing by providing a clear behavioural model for
why users - especially those who have been using e-
mail for a significant amount of time - become victims
of phishing attacks. A broader model of user behaviour
in phishing, including cognitive and perceptual inputs,
is then proposed, and the process of using the model to
propose and validate technical countermeasures is then
described.
II. TRUST ESTABLISHMENT AND
MAINTENANCE
Internet commerce depends on trust - users must
trust the platforms that they use, and those of the
merchants, auction houses and banks that they interact
with online. As bandwidth availability and reliability
becomes less of a concern, the core problem for users
is the extent to which they can trust the content that is
received. In many applications, users demand
authentic, up-to-date data with guaranteed integrity,
rather than sacrificing consistency to save a bit of
bandwidth. This will increasingly be the case where
web applications move from being simple catalogue
lookup sites to more interactive and integrated
applications, such as total wealth management and
other sophisticated applications of internet commerce.
Attacks like phishing threaten to erode public
confidence in what are many new and exciting
applications.
In this context, processes for modelling trust are
presented in this paper, comprising two key biological
learning processes:
(a) A mechanism for the establishment of trust,
that is based on a generic model of non-
associative learning (habituation), outlined
in this paper; and
(b) A mechanism for the maintenance of trust
relationships, that is based on sensitisation to
malevolent events
The mathematical basis of the model is drawn from
physiological models of non-associative learning in
human and non-human species, like the giant slug
(aplysia; [5]). The established benefits of using these
two learning processes are:
(a) Many decades of experimental data have
been gathered to support the processes of
habituation and sensitisation; and
(b) Mathematical models have been fitted to this
data with great accuracy; thus, future
responses can be predicted on the basis of
known data
In the sections that follow, habituation and
sensitisation processes will be reviewed to show that
they provide one model for understanding the
processes required to establish trust relationships
between e-mail receiving and sending entities, without
reference to any external third parties.
In addition, the relationship between this purely
behavioural level of explanation is contrasted with
other elements, such as cognitive processing, which
have an important role to play in preventing phishing
attacks in the future. The goal is not to downplay the
important role that entities like Phishtank play, but to
better understand the basic psychological processes
underlying trust establishment and management.
III. THE MODEL - HABITUATION
Two complementary processes are modelled in this
paper: habituation and sensitisation. Before these
concepts are reviewed in detail, the rationale for
considering the development and maintenance of trust
relationships between entities as a learning process will
be presented.
Consider the situation where two e-mail sending and
receiving entities on a network have no knowledge
about each other (say, in the form of a reputation score
supplied by a third party). How are these two parties to
trust each other? During any initial exchange, the
maxima of distrust occurs. However, if this first
interaction is successful, then the level of distrust is
likely to decrease at the second interaction, and so on.
After some number of successful interactions, the two
parties can be said to not distrust each other. This may
imply trust, but most likely, an ongoing monitoring of
the relationship integrity will continue.
For example, a user may become an Ebay user, and
after having many successful and rewarding purchases,
they are considered to have developed a trust
relationship with Ebay. In contrast, they may be
nervous about spending too much money on their first
Ebay purchase because their relationship is at the
maxima of distrust. If a user was not an Ebay user, but
they receive an e-mail purporting from Ebay about a
purchase that they have made, they are likely to be
very suspicious about the content - in essence, the
maxima of distrust has protected them from being
phished. On the other hand, after being a happy Ebay
user, their psychological guard is lowered, and they are
more likely to click on any message which purports to
come from Ebay.
This progressive reduction in distrust is a learning
conceptualisation of habituation, Le., where there is a
decrease in a dependent variable (distrust) as a result of
repeated, harmless (or beneficial) exposure to a
stimulus (interactions with another party). Each party
in an interaction is responsible for computing its own
response - but one can imagine that, if two parties with
zero knowledge about each other have equally
satisfying interactions (in quantity and quality), then
the distrust profiles for each other should be
equivalent. For example, Paypal may place restrictions
on user accounts until various verification checks have
been successfully completed. This approach introduces
more structure into the trust building process - more
for the benefit of existing verified users, rather than
new (and potentially malicious) users.
In biological terms, the initial approach of one entity
to another that produces a distrust maxima, is known as
the startle reaction [6]. In most biological systems, the
startle response and habituation can be observed in so-
called automatic (or autonomic) functions over which
conscious control is not exercised.
Note that habituation processes are always stimulus-
specific, meaning that a trust relationship developed
between two entities may not necessarily be
generalised to more than one service. For example, an
entity may be trusted to download data, but not upload
or an e-mail service may be trusted, but not a web
service. Similarly, users may learn to trust messages
from Ebay but not from another auction house, even if
their businesses carry out a similar function.
Different thresholds on the distrust curve may be
applied for different functions, and/or different rates of
learning to trust may also apply. In short, one could
imagine a two-dimensional matrix of trust association
trust values for each user x service interaction. These
may be related to the commercial value of the
relationship involved - for example, for high value
transactions like currency trading, users may be
reluctant to commit too much funds to an untrusted
service, while a micro-credit system with a limit of $10
per transaction would have a lower threshold to reach.
In biological terms, this is known as salience - relative
to other items of a similar type, how much does a
particular item stand out?
Habituation is not just a qualitative phenomenon, but
quantitative in the sense that models can be accurately
fitted to real-world data. Some examples of habituation
from the animal kingdom include:
• male sticklebacks, who mutually establish
boundaries over a period of 30 minutes,
with a 50% reduction in biting responses
[7]
• coelenterates, like the hydra, whose
probability of a response to an external
stimulus drops from 1.0 to 0.2 after several
hundred presentations [8]
• protozoans, such as stentor coeruleus,
which display a similar response profile to
the coelenterates [9]
Given its universality in the natural world, the
response profile of habituation has been very broadly
established. A number of general properties of
habituation have been determined that may be relevant
in the establishment of trust relationships between e-
mail senders and receivers, such as a primacy effect,
where initial interactions are treated with suspicion.
There are many implementations of habituation
which differ in the number of natural phenomena that
they attempt to reproduce. Figure 1 shows the distrust
function, computed through a simple habituation
model [10]. The decay of response to a stimulus
presented through a number of sequential interactions
shows how trust can be built up. In the absence of an
aversive stimulus, the function is smooth - more
sophisticated and non-linear behaviour can be
introduced by integrating the outputs of cascading
units, providing a quicker route to trust. As long a
sensible sensitisation function can be formulated to
reduce trust in the case of aversive event, the model
replicates desired behaviour in sending and receiving
agents.
What would make the model more directly useful
for modelling the building of trust in e-mail
interactions would be to correctly parameterise the
rates at which distrust decreases, and the appropriate
initial threshold at which the maxima of distrust
occurs , either through the primacy effect, or the startle
reflex.
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Figure 1. Distrust computed by habituation
model
IV. PHISHING
How does the model of trust establishment relate to
phishing? The answer is that it provides a clear
behavioural model for why users - especially those
who have been using e-mail for a significant amount of
time - become victims of phishing attacks. Although it
is possible that naive users might be phishing victims,
there is strong anecdotal evidence that even
experienced users can become victims [17].
Users - through experience - clearly become
habituated to the characteristics of a phishing e-mail
that might potentially flag it as a phishing message.
These characteristics include:
• The displayed URL being different to the
URL embedded in the HTML code and
usually visible when the user moves their
cursor over the link
• Spelling mistakes - even in the subject
line - of the bank's name from which the
phishing message has been purportedly
sent
• Being asked for additional information
(such as license and passport numbers) in
addition to nonnal banking login
credentials
As long as the shallow features of the message
appear to be genuine, the message tends to elicit a
behavioural rather than a cognitive response. This
means that most of the content in the message is not
processed at anything other than a shallow level.
Figure 4 shows a simplified version of a generic
psychological model that shows how these different
processing levels are related.
This outcome can be predicted from Craik and
Lockhart's [14] classic work on levels ofprocessing. In
this approach, depth of processing is defined by the
meanings extracted from the processing activity, rather
than focusing on the number of times an item of
information is processed. In this framework, shallow
processing occurs when users focus on structural
properties (such as how a word looks or sounds) versus
deep processing, where the actual meanings
(semantics) are extracted and understood in some way.
An example of the difference between shallow and
deep processing in phishing would be users who take a
cursory glance at the "Sender" or "Subject" field of an
e-mail, and quickly action the item by (inappropriately)
clicking on the link. Deep processing of the message
would involve the user reading the contents carefully,
cross-checking the claims made in the e-mail carefully,
and then verifying whether the displayed link actually
matched the known good link of the service in
question .
If users really read every word of a phishing
message, and checked the key structural elements such
as the URL, then phishing would not occur at the same
level that it currently does. So, while habituation is a
positive and natural for e-mail users to trust each other,
it may also lead to deeper processing at the cognitive
level not being performed.
Figure 2 shows a simple psychological (structural)
model that explains how phishing results from
behaviour over-riding cognition, as a result of
information which is visually acquired during
perceptual processing of e-mail messages . If a user is
habituated, they are more likely to be phished, than if
they cognitively process the phishing message at
sufficient depth.
Starting from the top of the diagram, when a user
receives a phishing message, the first level at which
they process the message's information is perceptual,
i.e., the characters of a message are extracted . If the
user has a very high trust level (or expectancy) of a
certain type of e-mail - such a message from a taxation
department - then they might simply click on the link
and be phished.
On the other hand, if they do not trust the message,
they are more likely to deeply process the contents of
the message and further investigate its provenance and
authenticity.
While this model is very general, it does open up
the possibility of using the model to suggest new
countermeasures or understand why some existing
countermeasures actually work. For example, newer
browsers which bold the fully-qualified domain name
of a webserver host are designed to operate at the
perceptual level, before behavioural responses are
initiated.
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Figure 2. Psychological model of phishing
V. THE MODEL - SENSITIZATION
From Figure I, you can see that habituation
converges on a distrust minima after a number of
stimulus presentations. This represents a mature trust
relationship - or one where phishing is more likely.
However, are there any biological correlates of
situations where this trust relationship is broken? One
can imagine many situations where this might occur
during e-mail exchange, including phishing attempts
that seek to take advantage of previously established
trust relationships'.
2 Or perhaps repeated media reports of how easily you
can be phished would also have this effect!
Sensitization provides one mechanism for rapidly
eliminating habituation in non-associative learning.
Sensitization arises when an aversive stimulus is
presented in place of the stimulus which is anticipated.
In the case of aplysia, this may mean that habituation
has been achieved by a gentle linear stroking, leading
to a distrust minima, and the aversive stimulus is
delivered in the form of a sharp tap. The immediate
reaction of aplysia is that habituation is minimized,
i.e., the habituation process needs to be initialized once
again before the response is minimized with respect to
the non-aversive stimulus [5]. Figure 3 shows a
sensitisation event following a previous habituation.
In terms of trust, aplysia-style sensitization provides
an "all-or-nothing" route to maximize distrust after
previously minimizing trust. Clearly, this does not
provide a generalizable model for all scenarios
involving a transition from a totally trusted to a less
trusted relationship. Penalties may be applied between
parties according to quite different policies, e.g., "three
strikes" policies against spammers, or immediate
termination of relationship if child pornography was
being distributed (and police notified). So, sensitization
matches some use cases but not all.
However, it should be noted that sensitization should
not necessarily be viewed as the opposite of
habituation. Indeed, for some species, sensitization is a
progressive amplification of a response which builds
up gradually - especially for more complex species
like human beings. An example is the amplification of
neural response to stimulation of some peripheral
nerves in response to repeated rubbing - after some
time, the response will be amplified to the degree that
pain is experienced [11].
Most importantly for internet commerce security,
sensitization predicts that - for users who have
previously been habituated and who are sensitized -
they will become habituated once again, given
sufficient time, and further positive interactions. This is
important, since a single poor experience with phishing
should not deter users from engaging in e-commerce as
a client.
However, the risk is that - if continued press
coverage about phishing begins to sensitize a
sufficiently large number of users, they may begin to
avoid internet commerce security applications, as their
cognitive processes take over their behavioural
responses. While cognitively processing messages is
encouraged, developing a generalized aversion to using
the web for banking would be a very poor outcome.
In terms of applying the phishing model to
sensitization, anti-phishing plug-ins appear to provide
the necessary sensitization event, where they flag a
message as potentially being a phishing message.
Reviewing the model, the plug-ins may be more
effective if multiple sensory modalities are utilized,
eg., flashing a warning visually on the screen while
playing an alert sound.
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VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper, an attempt has been made to illustrate
how some simple ideas from non-associative learning
theory can be used to provide a model for behavioural
responses in phishing attacks, based on the notion that
phishing succeeds when users trust a purported e-mail
sender too much. This trust starts at zero, and is built
up over successful, repeated interactions.
Models for habituation and sensitization have been
applied to understand current issues in distrust of e-
mail messages, such as phishing, and a first sketch of a
cognitive model to explain how phishing success can
result from habituation has been demonstrated. In
summary, users relying on habituation to process cues
about phishing in e-mail messages are not processing
messages cognitively at sufficient depth to detect some
fairly obvious clues.
Further work is required to implement cascaded
versions of the model, and a real-world implementation
with accompanying experiments will clarify whether
principles from the biological world are relevant to e-
mail technology. What is required to parameterise the
model is further data on which types of phishing e-mail
are more successful at luring users who have different
types of experience. This data could be used to test
model predictions based on various demographics.
Also, there seem to be some fairly obvious
characteristics of phishing e-mails that any deep
analysis by a user should identify, such as mis-
spellings.
Vendors are already using an implicit model of user
psychology to defeat phishing - both Microsoft
Internet Explorer and Mozilla Firefox have now
implemented anti-phishing measures at the perceptual
level, by bolding the fully-qualified domain names of
hosts when a users connects to a website using their
browser. By attempting to intervene between user's
learned responses, and the presentation of the message,
the vendors hope to subvert the semi-automated
responses of users who have learned to trust e-mail.
Moving beyond e-mail exchanges at the user level,
what role do intermediaries - such as distributed
reputation managers, certification agencies etc - have
to play in trust development and maintenance? Is there
a role for these agents in preventing phishing? Can
they adequately deal with zero-day exploits? What type
and scope of verification is required for phishing
reports?
The use cases considered in this paper are based
around the pairwise computation of trust (or distrust)
between two parties, but the mechanisms (habituation
and sensitization) do not immediately scale to cater for
more complex and/or distributed cases, that might
include a trusted third party. Saliency - mentioned
earlier - may be one factor, although repetition (as
seen in the habituation model) is also a factor.
Where reputation scores are computed in distributed
trust environments, it is certainly possible that distrust
scores computed from habituation and sensitization
processes could be used as one element of scoring. I.e.,
where an email recipient scores a recipient at maximal
distrust (e.g., as a phishing message), other e-mail
clients could consult other sources who have
previously dealt with the sender, or users could
combine their individual scores centrally. This type of
reputation model has worked quite successfully for
Ebay, for example, and it's interesting to note the
restrictions that were necessary to put in place in recent
years, including the prevention of sellers adding
negative ratings to buyers.
In the case of email, senders who have high distrust
scores could also be prevented from scoring down
those recipients who fail to trust them [12]. The
specific dynamics of these relationships - especially
where they involve assymetries and nonlinearities -
could be modelled using dynamical systems models
[13].
Further empirical work is required to determine
which type of psychological model is most appropriate
for understanding phishing in different contexts.
Habituation, for example, is not an appropriate model
where there is an element of reward in the activity;
thus, it works well for understanding the time-
pressured reading of e-mails, but not so well for
understanding highly-rewarding activities like social
networking.
In addition, the behavioural level is just one level in
a broader psychological understanding of how time-
pressured decision making about phishing e-mails
results in poor choices. Future work will examine how
decision models based on the accumulation of
information - such as a random walk model for two-
choice reaction time [18] - can be used to understand
the interplay between cognitive and behavioural
processing in phishing. Indeed, there has already been
some excellent progress in this area vis-a-vis human
factors in security [19, 20].
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